THE NEUTRALITY OF ADHERENCE TO
PRECEDENT
ROBERT L. BIRMINGHAM*

Bad law is better than no law, because it establishesuniformity. If you
divide money or cattle by drawing lots, it does not follow that such
drawingmakes afairdivision, but disputes will thus be avoided.t

One tradition of law in China insisted that an emperor ideally
governed by setting an example for others through living virtuously
himself.1 His conduct was thought to provide a model for the conduct
of his subjects not only with respect to social but also with respect to
aesthetic concerns. Imperial appreciation of works of art, a duty often
pursued with an indiscriminate enthusiasm which lesser men could
hardly emulate, was typically celebrated by affixing a seal and
perhaps an inscription to the object admired. Since some rulers were
particularly indefatigable observers and since the tastes of successive
rulers as Well as of other connoisseurs who similarly recorded their
experiences were not widely disparate, the seals and inscriptions
superimposed on many of the more prestigious older paintings
obscure much if not most of the beauty to which these markings
2
presume to attest.
More than a decade ago Professor Wechsler argued that
constitutional adjudication should be evaluated primarily in terms of
the neutrality of the principles on which the decisions are based. 3 The
response to his argument is reminiscent of, if not so reverential as, the
reception accorded works of art in China. His initially elusive
contribution has been additionally obscured by the mass of
commentary concerning it.4 However, the continuing discussion of
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law. A.B., University of

Pittsburgh, J.D., 1963, Ph.D., 1967; LL.M., Harvard Law School, 1965.
t Hsidn Tzu (320-235 B.C.), quoted in Tsao, Equity in Chinese Customary Law, in ESSAYS
INJURISPRUDENCE INHONOR OF ROSCOE POUND 21, 23 nA (R. Newman ed. 1962).
1. D. BODDE & C. MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA 17-23 (1967); T. CH'i, LAW AND
SOCIETY IN TRADITIONAL CHINA 253-56 (1961).
2. K. LATOURETTE, THE CHINESE: THEIR HISTORY AND CULTURE 623 (4th ed. 1964);
Sullivan, The Heritage of Chinese Art, in THE LEGACY OF CHINA 165, 211 (R. Dawson ed.

1964). Chinese history is nevertheless not an unrelieved chronicle of cultural enlightenment. See
D. BLOODWORTH, THE CHINESE LOOKING GLASS 37 (1967).
3. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw. 73 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as Principles].

4. The concept of neutrality that he introduced has been repeatedly attacked as
unintelligible: Professor Wright, finding it the product of theories more misleading than
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and frequent approving references to the concept of neutral principles
demonstrate the existence of a core of meaning offering important
insights into the judicial process. One feels that the proposed standard
has significance; the problem is to isolate and explicate those elements
embedded in the analysis of Professor Wechsler which are responsible

for this significance.
In this paper I seek to explore one aspect of the standard proposed
by Professor Wechsler through examination of an often remarked
interrelationship between this standard 5 and those values which
support adherence to precedent. In my analysis I apply and evaluate a

criterion paralleling that which would renounce the legitimacy of
value choices in an adjudicatory context; here, however, the argument
is inverted. The criterion is taken to supply a sufficient rather than a
necessary condition of neutrality. My reasoning, in part involving the
role of precedent without reference to the concerns of Professor
Wechsler, is grounded on distinctions generated in the theory of
games, a branch of mathematics of increasing importance in
economics and other social sciences. 6
enlightening, posits confusion and incorrectness. Wright, The Supreme Court Cannot be
Neutral, 40 TEx. L. REV. 599 (1962). Professor Countryman attributes his inability to
understand to what he describes as an intense lack of definition. Countryman, The Constitution
andJob Discrimination,39 WASH. L. REv. 74,75-76 (1964). Professor Pollak appears willing to
proclaim either innocuity or incomprehensibility but uncertain as to which pronouncement is
appropriate. Pollak, Racial Discriminationand Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor
Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 34 (1959). See also Pollak, ConstitutionalAdjudication:
Relative or Absolute Neutrality, I 1J. PuB. L. 48, 55 (1962).
5. The standard of neutrality has been interpreted to deny the propriety ofjudicial decisions
resulting from choice among competing values. At most this interpretation receives uncertain
support from the pronouncements of the progenitor of the concept: although his position has not
been unambiguous, Professor Wechsler apparently contended in his initial exposition that judges
must make value choices and has subsequently affirmed this claim. Principles 15; see H.
WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW xiii (1961); Wechsler, The Courts
andthe Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1001, 1013-14 (1965). That doubt remains appears in
large part a consequence of the absence of plausible alternative interpretations: the distinction
between value judgments and other judgments, while not always clear, permits at least a
modicum of classificatory precision; on the other hand, differentiation between acceptable and
unacceptable value judgments appears necessarily to depend on individual preference or
arbitrary rule.
6. In another paper the author introduced aspects of the theory of games to explain the
relationship which Professor Wechsler and others perceive between the standards of neutrality
and generality. See Birmingham, The Generality of Neutral Principles:A Game-Theoretic
Perspective,58 CALIF. L. REv. 873 (1970).

Vol. 1971:541]

NEUTRALITY
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In his discussion of neutrality Professor Wechsler stated that
Brown v. Board of Education7 and parallel decisions prohibiting the
white primary s and preventing enforcement of racially restrictive
covenants 9 were more likely to yield enduring advantage to the
community than were other recent rulings of the Supreme Court. Yet
he argued that these cases achieved desirable results only by
abandoning that reasoned exposition of the law thought indispensably
associated with judicial resolution of disputes. His dissatisfaction
appears to be a consequence of an inability to assign priority to one of
two competing associational claims-he criticized these decisions
because they fail objectively to justify imposition of association on
those who would avoid it rather than denial of association to those
who would embrace it.'
The Court in Plessy v. Ferguson" approved separation of the races
so long as the members of each race were treated equally. In Brown
the Court partially repudiated Plessy by explicitly rejecting language
in this earlier decision inconsistent with its conclusion that separate
schooling is psychologically injurious to black children. Arguably it
did much more; however, even here the Court might have asserted a
perhaps implausible historical continuity by stressing the extent to
which its holding may be interpreted as merely an application of the
separate but equal standard thought controlling in Plessy.1 2 Scholars
have sought to discount the deficiencies of Brown by finding in this or
in other ways that a neutrality unrecognized by Professor Wechsler
arises from the consistency of this decision with prior rulings of the
Court.
In Sweatt v. Painter"'and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).

9. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
10. Principles34.
II. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
12. Perhaps aberrational, Plessy assumed the constitutionality of the dual school system but
directly involved only segregation in transportation. 163 U.S. at 544. Brown, the basis of
broader per curiam rulings, purported to decide only that separate institutions were
constitutionally insufficient in the field of public education regardless of their physical

equivalence. 347 U.S. at 495. For remarks concerning the relationship between these cases see A.
BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGREss 4 (1970); Pollak, supranote 4, at 29.

But cf.Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927).

13. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
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Regents, 4 integration of graduate facilities was compelled in part
because equality of education was defined in terms of opportunity for
contact with members of the professionally and socially dominant
race. While these cases do not announce the holding in Brown, they
may be read to impose conditions of equality sufficiently stringent in
practice to preclude separate schooling. They thus provide a
foundation for the assertion that observers could anticipate as almost
inevitable the ultimate repudiation of the separate but equal
formula.'5 Professor Wright, although emphasizing that precedent is
not dispositive of the decision in Brown, argues that the opinion
should have included a more comprehensive review both of these cases
and of cases prior to Plessy.5 Professor Bartley contends that the
Sweatt and McLaurin decisions left prior doctrine with but a shadow
of legality. He appears to regret that the Court relied upon historical,
psychological, and sociological arguments and largely ignored what7
he considers a formidable body of precedent supporting its position.
The approach adopted by these scholars assumes that the
legitimacy of judicial action depends in some measure on the extent to
which issues paralleling those which this action resolves have been
similarly resolved in the context of earlier disputes. Although
Professor Wechsler both unequivocally denied that departure from
precedent was the source of his discontent with Brown" and more
generally refused to consider the judiciary bound by its mistakes, his
plea for neutrality has been interpreted-or, probably more
accurately, misinterpreted-as little more than an affirmation of the
sanctity of stare decisis. 1" Thus Judge Clark, who ends by urging the
propriety of the unprincipled decision, states:
Perhaps I oversimplify, but the net result does appear to be that the principled
14. 339 U.S. 637 (1950); accord, Sipuel v. University of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1948);
Missouri exrel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
15. W. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT 80 (1962); Fortas, The Amendment and
Equality Under Law, in THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: CENTENNIAL VOLUMlE 100, 110-11 (B.
Schwartz ed. 1970); Kamisar, Introduction to ARGUMENT: THE ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE TIME
SuPREMtE COURT IN BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, 1952-55 Xiii, xiv-xvii (L.
Friedman ed. 1969); Clark, Book Review, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 239, 240-41 (1968). See Fiss,
RacialImbalance in the PublicSchools: The ConstitutionalConcepts, 78 HARv. L. Rev. 564,
606 (1965).
16. Wright, supranote 4, at 611.
17. N. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE 6,58 (1969).
18. Principles 31; see H. WECHSLER, THE NATIONALIZATION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CIVIL
RIcHTS 22-23 (1970).
19. Velvel, Suggested Approaches to Constitutional Adjudication and Apportionment, 12
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1381, 1387 (1965).
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decision is one which follows the beaten track rather closely, while a decision
without precedent, breaking new ground, must be unprincipled ...
..inTlhere is. ..a kind of pressure--even presumption-to choose what
seems the side closest to precedent and past action. And that means a
conservative vote for inaction and the status quo. It is a sad, but little noticed,
fact that neutral principles eventually push to re-enforce the dead hand of the
law and the rule of the past.2

This interpretation receives some support from the assertion by
Professor Wechsler that precedent is not without importance and
from his agreement with the statement of Justice Holmes that
"imitation of the past, until we have a clear reason for change, no

more needs justification than appetite."' 2' However, the result owes
less to exegesis than to perceived logical necessity; if neutrality does
not in part imply adherence to precedent many persons would contend
that it lacks concrete content. Seeking the minimal attributes of

neutrality, Professor Golding reasons:
I fail to grasp Professor Wechsler's position if it consists in the statement that
one ought to, or even can, supply "neutral principles" for "choosing" between
competing values. I can, of course, choose between two competing values by
reference to a third value which is more comprehensive or supreme, that is,
when there is already an ordering of values. Assuming such an ordering, it
seems to make sense to speak of "reasoned choice between competing values."
...But it is difficult to see how the ordering itself is to be made on "neutral
principles."
Perhaps, however, even lacking such an ordering of values, all is not lost for
principled decision-making ...
Thus, when, in deciding a case, a tribunal is faced with two competing
values and there is no good reason to be advanced for preferring one value over
another, so that the preference given to one value is entirely arbitrary, if you
please, we may still require that the tribunal formulate a standard or criterion
that shall function as a principle of decision in this and other cases of its
type....
It seems to me that the aspect of principled decision I have just described is
not so remote from what Professor Wechsler demands of the Court in his
appraisal ofjudicial review.Y

This posited appropriateness of adherence to precedent and the
20. Clark, A Plea for the Unprincipled Decision, 49 VA. L. RV. 660, 664 (1963); see

Countryman, supra note 4, at 75-76.
21. O.W. HOLMES, Holdsworth's English Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 285, 290
(1920); Principles 17.
22. Golding, PrincipledDecision-Makingand the Supreme Court, 63 COLUM. L. Rav. 35,
48-49 (1963). See also Abramson, Those Still Elusive NeutralPrinciples-A FurtherGroping,7
DuQuEsNE L. Rav. 245, 246 (1968); Broiles, The Principlesof Legal Reasoning, 17 MERCER L.

R y. 389, 392-94 (1966).
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independence of such adherence from choice among competing values
can be best explained in terms of the theory of games.
GAME THEORY-COMPETITIVE AND COORDINATED DECISIONS

A game is a set of rules delineating possible actions by individuals
or groups and the consequences of such actions. The rules normally
designate a set of players, define the behavioral choices open to the
players and the information on which these choices must be based,
and associate with each combination of choices an outcome
comprising a payoff to each player.? The prototypical dispute at law
may be described in terms of the strictly competitive two-person
game. In this game the players have diametrically opposed
preferences: if one player prefers one outcome to another, the other
player will prefer the other outcome; if one player is indifferent
between two outcomes, the other player will also be indifferent.
Likewise in the law, if, for example, a claim for damages is litigated
the extent of the victory of the plaintiff usually measures the loss to
the defendant.
Data concerning a game may be summarized diagramatically, as
in Figure 1. In the game shown each player unless otherwise
constrained may choose one of two courses of conduct: player A may
BI
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Figure I
23. See generally M. DAVIS, GAME THEORY: A NONTECHNICAL INTRODUCTION (1970); R.
LUCE & H. RAWTFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS: INTRODUCTION AND CRITICAL SURVEY (1957); J.
VON NEUMANN & 0. MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (3d ed.
1953); G. OWEN, GAM THEORY (1968).
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select either row 1 or row 2, while player B may select either column I
or column 2. The squares, representing the four possible combinations
of choices, are marked with the payoffs to the players. The numbers in
the lower left and upper right corners of a square indicate gain derived
by players A and B respectively from the combination of choices
associated with that square. Gain is most conveniently expressed in
monetary units, dollars or perhaps thousands of dollars.
The choices of the players jointly determine which of the four sets
of payoffs will be realized. Let player A select row 1 with probability
x; then, since he must select either row I or row 2, the probability that
he will select row 2 is necessarily 1 - x. Similarly y and I - y may be
introduced to designate the probabilities of selection of column I and
of column 2 by player B. The expected payoffs to players A and B can
be written as functions of the probabilities x and y:24

EA (X Y)

=X + y- 1

EB(x,y) = -x-y + 1.

(1)
(2)

The strictly competitive nature of the relationship between the players
is evident on calculation of the rate of change of the expected payoff to
each player as the probabilities governing the actions of the players
change:
OEA

OEA

ox

oy

0 EB
ox

= - 1(3)

= a EB = -1.

(4)

Oy

Because a change in either probability causes changes opposite in sign
in the expected payoffs to the players one player must lose if the other
gains. Both x and y, being probabilities, must be non-negative and
cannot exceed unity. Player A can maximize his gain by setting x
equal to unity without regard to the behavior of player B; similarly,
player B can profit by setting y equal to zero without regard to the
24. K. BORCH, THE ECONOMICS OF UNCERTAINTY 129-35 (1968).
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behavior of player A. Their combined actions produce the outcome of
the upper right square: the payoff to each player if neither is
constrained is zero units. Substitution of the values of x and y selected
by players A and B respectively into equations (1) and (2) therefore
yields:
EA

=

EB = 0.

(5)

Legal rules may be considered operators directly affecting either
the probabilities x and y or the payoffs to the players. The law may be
interpreted to prevent one player or the other from choosing a
particular row or column; alternatively, where, for example, the law
permits one player to recover damages if the other chooses a
particular row or column, it may be thought to alter the consequences
of this choice and thus to change x or y by indirection. The difficulty
here is that the law in either granting or denying relief must choose to
aid one player at the expense of the other. To reduce x is to benefit B
but injure A; to raise y is to benefit A but injure B; to fail to do either
is equivalently consequential. No rule applied to the game as
presented can offer mutual advantage.
In his recent analysis of convention and its relationship to
language,2 5 Professor Lewis elaborates a number of situations
presenting a common problem-in each, gain to the individuals
involved requires coordinated conduct. Motorists may drive on the
right side of the road or on the left side of the road; which side is
chosen is of little consequence so long as all drivers choose identically.
Each of a group of persons wishing to meet but unable to
communicate in any other way must try to anticipate where others
will congregate. If a telephone conversation is cut off, one but not
both of those persons interrupted ought to call to reestablish contact.
Persons attending a party may seek to dress comparably although
they do not care whether all wear formal or all wear informal attire.
Oarsmen should row in unison; campers searching for firewood
should not retrace the steps of their fellows. Those engaged in
commerce gain by establishing a medium of exchange irrespective of
the object chosen to be numeraire. Each oligopolist attempts to set
prices approximately equal to the prices set by his competitors.
25. D. L wIs, CONVETImON: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY (1969). See also de Saussure, On the
Nature of Language.in INTRODUCTION TO STRUCTIURALISM 43 (M. Lane ed. 1970).
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Language must be shared but one may otherwise arbitrarily associate
2
sound and meaning. 6
Bl
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Figure 2

Reduced to its two-person analogue and thought typical of
situations where coordination is appropriate, the problem confronting
the motorist may be restated as the game shown in Figure 2. Here
choice of row 1 by player A or column 1 by player B may be taken to
indicate that the choosing player drives on the right side of the road,
while choice of row 2 by player A or column 2 by player B may be
taken to indicate that the choosing player drives on the left side of the
road. Again payoffs measure monetary benefit. If the players
simultaneously choose to drive on the right side of the road or on the
left side of the road, both gain one unit because each can go about his
business without injury or delay; if they simultaneously select
different sides of the road consequent collision negates this gain.
The expected payoffs to the players, in this instance algebraically
identical, may as before be expressed in terms of the probabilities that
player A will choose row I and that player B will choose row 2:
EA(xy) = EB (x,y) =

2 xy-x-y

+ 1.

(6)

The rates of change of the expected payoffs to the players as these
probabilities are altered confirm a nonantagonistic interdependence
because in every instance variation causes them undifferentiated gain
or loss:
26. D. Lmwis, supranote 25, at 5-8.
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OEB
-

Ox

=2y - 1

(7)

= 2x- 1.

(8)

Ox
OEB

O EA

Oy

Oy

If player A believes that player B is as likely to select column 1 as
he is to select column 2 and player B believes that player A is as likely
to select row I as he is to select row 2, both players are without guides
to decision: 2y - I and 2x - 1, the terms which register the impact of
their choices, reduce to zero. Independent manipulation of the
probabilities x and y is without prospective -advantage. The
anticipated unresponsiveness of contemplated gain to individually
patterned action is due to, but also reinforces, the unpredictability of
conduct; as a result of randomized behavior, each player can expect to
achieve only one-half of that benefit potentially available to him.
Substitution of the suggested values of x and y into equation (6)
yields:
EA=

EB = .5.

(9)

Were concerted action possible, x and y could together be set equal to
either zero or unity to obtain:
EA = EB

= 1.

(10)

Since those participating in games of the type discussed
necessarily share any advantage, prevention of waste requires only
salience. The players can be expected to coordinate their conduct if
one set of actions stands out from the rest because it is unique in some
conspicuous respect. Consistent achievement of a desired outcome is
thus frequently feasible without formalized standards of behavior
enforced through punishment of persons who do not adhere to them.
One normally drives on the right side of the road in th.e United States
and on the left side of the road in certain other countries not because
one is subject to a penalty imposed by the state for failure to do so but
because violation of an arbitrarily established traffic regulation can,
independently of sanction, cause personal injury or property damage.
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Solutions to the other problems previously introduced are similarly
conventional. Ideally all persons behave in particular ways, expect
others to behave in ways consistent with them, and prefer to behave as
they do on condition that others behave as expected.2Y
That achievement of desired equilibria may prove practicable even
where no clear rule exists and the information of the players is
otherwise sharply limited is evident from an experiment reported by
Professor Schelling in which subjects were instructed to designate a
meeting place in New York City. A majority of those questioned,
apparently members of the Yale University community, selected the
information booth at Grand Central Station; when asked to choose a
time, almost all designated noon.Y In a parallel context Professor
Lewis concludes: "The man in the song-'Standing on a corner with
a dollar in my hand / Looking for a woman who's looking for a
man'- is standing on that corner in conformity to a convention
29
among all the local prostitutes and their customers."
THE NEUTRALITY OF PRECEDENT-ADVANTAGE TO LITIGANTS

A scholar of the law in medieval France contended that a judge
ought to be disqualified not only on such expected grounds as
personal enmity toward a litigant or idiocy, but also for taking part in
the prior decision of a similar case. The likelihood that he would
decide the second case as he had decided the first was thought a source
of bias sufficient to preclude his participation. The disregard of
previously established principles implicit in this rule, while not
without its modern equivalents, 31 is historically atypical. The
substantial respect normally accorded these principles is probably
best expressed by Blackstone, who urged that "precedents and rules
must be followed, unless flatly absurd or unjust; for though their
reason be not obvious at first view, yet we owe such a deference to
former times as not to suppose that they acted wholly without
' 32
consideration.
27. Id. at 42-51, 58, 76, 78-79.
28. T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 55-56 (1960).

29. D. LEwis, supra note 25, at 43 (emphasis in original).
30. J. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW xv (1968).
31. H. Cox, THE FEAST OF FooLs 34 (1969); J.PLUMB, THE DEATH OF THE PAST 44 (1970).
32. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *70. See also Mirehouse v. Rennell, 5 Eng. Rep.
759, 774 (K.B. 1833). "Precedent has ... always been the life-blood of legal systems, whether
primitive, archaic or modern:' D. LLOYD, INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 367 (rev. ed.
1965) (footnote omitted).
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The source of this respect has not been obvious. The argument
that a rule which has stood the test of time is more likely to be
advantageous than one which has not explains little because whether a
rule has stood the test of time is often what must be resolved in the
particular instance.- That those who decided disputes in the past were
wiser than those who decide disputes today is an inadequate basis for
acquiescence in their rulings not only because it is implausible. The
wisdom of previous judges is not an a priori truth and comprehensive
evaluation of their work is seldom as economical or as reliable as
judgment concerning a small part of it.Y To avoid relitigating each
issue in every context in which it appears is indisputably convenient
but appeal to this convenience does not adequately explain judicial
practice. 5 From the perspective of the revolutionary, the members of
the legal profession may demand continuity in the law as a means of
preserving those conditions which have allowed them to achieve
relative eminence; although perhaps correct, this conclusion has little
persuasive force independent of the widely rejected ideological
presuppositions on which it rests.36
The significance of adherence to precedent may more profitably be
stated in terms of the prominence which consistent selection affords
one of several otherwise undifferentiated solutions to a problem of
coordination:
Indeed, precedent is merely the source of one important kind of salience:
conspicuous uniqueness of an equilibrium because we reached it last time.Y

Salience in general is uniqueness of a coordination equilibrium in a

preeminently conspicuous respect. The salience due to precedent is no

exception: it is uniqueness of a coordination equilibrium in virtue of its
preeminently conspicuous analogy to what was done successfully before. 31
It does not matter why coordination was achieved at analogous equilibria
in the previous cases. Even if it had happened by luck, we could still follow the
precedent set.39
Each new action in conformity to the regularity adds to our experience of
33. But see Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22,31-32 (1922).

34. See Y.B. 36 Hen. 6, f. 25b, pl. 26 (1458).
35. Langbein, Modern Jurisprudencein the House of Lords: The Passing of "London
Tramways," 53 CORNELL L. REv. 807,811 (1968).
36. Gerber & McAnany, Punishment:CurrentSurvey of Philosophy and Law, II ST. Louis
U.L.J. 491, 504 (1967), reprinted in THE SOCIOLOGY OF PUNIsnMr AND CORRECTioN 337,
338 (2d ed. N. Johnston, L. Savitz & M. Wolfgang eds. 1970). See Wolff, On Violence, 66 J.
PHIL. 601 (1969).
37. D. Lewis, supranote 25, at 36.
38. Id. at 38.
39. Id. at 39 (emphasis in original).
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general conformity. Our experience of general conformity in the past leads us,
by force of precedent, to expect a like conformity in the future. And our

expectation of future conformity is a reason to go on conforming, since to
conform if others do is to achieve a coordination equilibrium and to satisfy
one's own preferences. . . . Once the process gets started, we have a
metastable self-perpetuating system of preferences, expectations, and actions

capable of persisting indefinitely. 0

This view of precedent not only explains its doctrinal importance but
also suggests an approach to the puzzle of the principled decision.
Controversy concerning the concept of neutrality has, in large
measure, focused on the relationship between this concept and judicial
choice among competing values. At least on one level of analysis the
patently designative function of precedent in the law permits
adjudication with at most minimal recourse to value choices. That
application of a principle causes loss to no individual may be thought
a condition sufficient to assure the neutrality of that principle.
However, if disputes at law must without exception be characterized
as strictly competitive games, no legal principle can be neutral in this
primitive sense. By definition, any judicial decision granting or
refusing relief must benefit one player through sacrifice of the
interests of the other player.
An alternative in conceptual terms is to focus attention on the
considerations which determine the outcome of litigation rather than
on the outcome itself. To the extent that promotion of specific
values-inevitable in any case-occurs only incidentally through
judicial action in obedience to precedent, a court may be thought to
function in the context of a game of coordination rather than in the
context of a strictly competitive game. Since in games of coordination
all players share any loss or advantage, the decisions of a court can, to
this extent, be considered neutral irrespective of the inability of the
court legitimately to posit preference for the values which it ultimately
implements. Professor Radbruch identified the creation and
maintenance of legal certainty, peace, and order as the great task of
judicial institutions. 41 In this view legal rules are essentially a source of
salience; the continuity which the law supplies through assured
application of settled principles is both the foundation of its neutrality
and its most significant contribution to the well-being of society.
Consideration of the neutrality of the decision to follow or to
40. Id. at 41-42.

41. G. RADBRUCH,

LEGAL PHILOSOPHY

118 (K. Wilk transl. 1950).
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depart from prior rulings demonstrates that this approach is not
entirely satisfactory. Salience in the law can be achieved through
means alternative to present practice. The possibility that the
intuitively just result may offer a less ambiguous coordinative fulcrum
than a set of ostensibly more concrete but often seemingly conflicting
legal principles can be excluded only by observation in the particular
instance.42 At the opposite extreme, a clear but arbitrary rule-for
example a rule that the taller litigant must win-may provide a salient
but otherwise unsatisfactory guide to resolution of disputes.
Adjudicatory certainty cannot be absolute but must be qualified
through those compromises necessary simultaneously to implement
43
values inconsistent with it.
The judicial inclination to perpetuate a current principle and thus
to continue gains from coordination may or may not be reinforced by
the pattern of payoffs dictated by that principle in a strictly
competitive game between individual litigants or the classes whose
interests they represent. When advantages anticipated from alteration
of this pattern of payoffs are thought to outweigh the prospective cost
of change in terms of loss of salience the principle will normally be
repudiated. As a result, the value judgment banished at the primary
stage of analysis is reasserted on a more abstract plane.
Determination of the effect of precedent may of course itself be taken
to involve a game of coordination; at this point, however, the
regressive nature of the problem and its solution is evident.
In an analogous context Professor Bickel reasons from similar
premises to a parallel conclusion. Commenting on the freedom of the
Supreme Court to decide or to refrain from deciding a case he asserts:
--- a neutral principle ... is, for Mr. Wechsler, a rule of action that the
Court must be prepared to apply unrelentingly and without compromise in all
future cases to which it is relevant .... 4
It follows that the techniques and allied devices for staying the Court's
hand, as is avowedly true at least of certiorari, cannot themselves be principled
in the sense in which we have a right to expect adjudications on the merits to be
principled. They mark the point at which the Court gives the electoral
institutions their head and itself stays out of politics, and there is nothing
42. Cf. F. CotHoN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS 34-35 (1933); Dworkin, The Model
of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 14, 40 (1967); Rumble, American Legal Realism and the
Reduction of Uncertainty.13 J. PUB. L. 45,46 (1964); Sartorius, The Doctrineof Precedentand
the Problem of Relevance, 53 ARCHIV FUR RECHTS-UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHiE 343,358 (1967).
43. F. CASTBERG, PROBLEMS OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 74 (rev. ed. 1957).
44. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
PoLmcs 129 (1962).
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paradoxical in finding that here is where the Court is most a political
animal....
But this is not to concede unchanneled, undirected, uncharted discretion. It
is not to concede decision proceeding from impulse, hunch, sentiment,
predilection, inarticulable and unreasoned. The antithesis of principle in an
institution that represents decency and reason is not whim or even expediency,
but prudence.'

His argument emphasizes the need at some level of analysis to
sacrifice salience in order to achieve other goals and the improbability
that the extent of this sacrifice can be meaningfully measured.
Even assuming that situations in which prior decisions should and
should not be followed are clearly defined, the approach implies the
necessity of value choices in formulating rules. Justifying adherence to
precedent by reference to gains from coordination provides a ground
for reducing the importance of discriminate balancing of competing
interests when disputes are adjudicated in the absence of controlling
authority. Undue attention to coordinative advantage in such
circumstances may encourage the development of uncomplicated
rules which achieve the heightened salience of the bright line only by
sacrificing the appropriate responsiveness to the conflicting concerns
of individual litigants. The arbitrariness of many rules of property
law, 46 for example, should not be extended to other fields where
coordination is a relatively less significant legal function. Here again
recourse to subjective criteria seems mandatory.
In preceding paragraphs I have attempted to explain the suggested
neutrality of obedience to precedent in terms of a shift of judicial
focus from a game involving choice among inconsistent values to one
in which intervention offers advantage to all players. Two approaches
to Brown v. Boardof Education47 paralleling that which would seek to

supply a basis in precedent for the decision of the Court present
concomitant opportunities for application of the distinction between
45. Id. at 132-33.
46. Most zealous of all for certainty in the law are property lawyers, for a system of
rules, precisely defined and invariably applied by the courts, is essential to the institution
of private property. Let one judge in one case in a superior court depart from one of the
traditional rules of common law or equity relating to property, he immediately creates a
furore in the profession; for as a result of this one decision, which may be fair as between
the parties, thousands of like titles are rendered doubtful, the intentions of many testators
who assumed the old law are likely to be frustrated and future conveyances cannot be

drafted with any confidence. F.

DOWRICK, JUSTICE ACCORDING TO THE ENGLISH

CoNMMoN LAWYERS 187 (1961) (footnote omitted).

See also Vallejo v. Wheeler, 98 Eng. Rep. 1012, 1017 (K.B. 1774).
47. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See text accompanying notes 6-21 supra.
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games of coordination and strictly competitive games. First, in the
context of Brown, and in other situations, resort to prior rulings need
not be sharply differentiated from reliance on other sources of salience
not judicially created. Second, reexamination of the interests of the
parties before the Court may be thought to reveal their unadmitted
complementarity. In the remaining paragraphs of this section I
propose briefly to examine these alternative approaches.
The considerations which support stare decisis are equally
pertinent to the enforcement of externally established norms.
Implementation of legislative and constitutional values may, from
one vantage point, be understood in terms of the role of the courts in
promoting salience necessary to cooperative benefit. To Professor
Black the ruling in Brown follows immediately from the propositions
that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment must be
read to prohibit state action which significantly disadvantages the
Negro race and that segregation is disadvantageous in the prohibited
sense.48 Professor Kinoy argues a parallel position with equal vigor:
When racial segregation is understood as a "badge of servitude" and an
obstacle to the achievement of the constitutionally promised status of freedom
for the Negro, the hazy confusions of the Wechsler criticisms vanish. The right
of the freedmen to be freed of the marks of the "inferior race" may not be
constitutionally balanced against the "right" of white citizens to cling to the
trappings of the "superior race." That question was settled, not in Brown v.
Board of Educ., but in the Civil War and in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
49
Amendments themselves.

Use of the concept of coordination to explain judicial adherence to
legislative and constitutional commands may nevertheless be thought
an instance of analytic overkill because inquiry perhaps properly
terminates with recognition that courts assert values presented to
them because that is their function.
Professor Wright asks whether Professor Wechsler meant to
imply that every member of the racial groups involved in Brown must
emerge from litigation with his right of association unimpaired before
action by the Court is to be considered defensible. -0 Such an
implication, while confirming a distaste for judicial intervention in the
strictly competitive game, would deny the sufficiency of a solution
48. Black, The Lawfulness of the SegregationDecisions. 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960).
49. Kinoy, The ConstitutionalRight of Negro Freedom, 21 RrrEs L. REv. 387, 430

n.139 (1967). See also Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 677-78 n.7 (1966)
(dissenting opinion); Gould, Book Review, 39 U. Dr. L.J. 624,627 (1962).
50. Wright, supra note 4, at 607.
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involving simply a shift in focus from this game to the game of
coordination conjoined to it. However, here also a parallel response
may not be inappropriate. Professors Bickel and Black point out the
possibility that injury did not occur, suggesting respectively that
separate public schooling and that segregation in any form may cause
loss to both races. 51 Their assertions provide a basis-albeit a
paternalistic one-for contending that the apparent conflict of
associational values which troubled Professor Wechsler is illusory,
and that the participants in the game before the Court were prevented
by ignorance from achieving an otherwise available outcome
advantageous to all.
51. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREm COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 120 (1970); Black, supra
note 48, at 428. See also Principles26-27, 34.

